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ABSTRACT 
  Virtually immune from judicial sanction, professional discipline, 
and civil liability, prosecutors enjoy limitless, unmonitored, and, for 
the most part, unreviewable power. This power and insulation from 
review invite abuse and public mistrust, shaking confidence in the 
criminal justice system. With the system in need of a means of curbing 
errant prosecutors and restoring public confidence, this Note explores 
a neglected mechanism of prosecutorial oversight—the superseder 
power—and argues for increased use of this oversight mechanism, 
coupled with explicit guidelines for its use and a public review 
process. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, citizens of Durham, North Carolina, witnessed firsthand 
the full breadth of prosecutorial power in the American criminal 
justice system and its impact on public trust and community relations. 
In March of that year, an African-American exotic dancer accused 
three members of the Duke University men’s lacrosse team of rape 
and sexual assault.1 The case grabbed headlines, as its elements of 
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 1. Samiha Khanna & Anne Blythe, DNA Tests Ordered for Duke Athletes, NEWS & 
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 24, 2006, at A1. 
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race, class, and gender captivated the general public.2 National media 
descended on the city. As racial tensions flared within the 
community,3 the local district attorney, Michael Nifong, conducted a 
barrage of media interviews and continually assured the public that a 
crime had occurred.4 The evidence that surfaced over time, however, 
failed to conform to his initial statements.5 While the case crumbled, 
Nifong’s actions came under scrutiny, and he faced allegations of 
prosecutorial improprieties, including failure to disclose exculpatory 
evidence,6 inflammatory extrajudicial statements,7 and charges that he 
pursued the case for political gain.8 Even so, Nifong remained on the 
case. A firestorm of criticism followed, as public confidence in the 
handling of the case—and the district attorney’s office—plummeted,9 
creating distrust in the North Carolina justice system as a whole. 
Lacking a mechanism to remove the district attorney from the case 
without his approval, however, state government officials were 
powerless to intervene and thwart the misuse of prosecutorial 
power.10 
The Duke Lacrosse case is just one illustration of a troubling 
aspect of the American legal system: the limitless, unmonitored, and, 
 
 2. Erik Brady & Mary Beth Marklein, A Perfect Storm, USA TODAY, Apr. 26, 2006, at 
C1. 
 3. Benjamin Niolet, Anne Blythe & Jane Stancill, Lacrosse Players’ Lawyers Object, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 30, 2006, at A1. 
 4. Joseph Neff, Duke Lacrosse Files Show Gap in DA’s Case, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 6, 2006, at A1. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Michael Biesecker, Benjamin Niolet & Joseph Neff, DA on Spot for Comments, NEWS 
& OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 22, 2006, at A1. 
 7. Matt Dees, Nifong Broke Rules, Bar Alleges, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 
29, 2006, at A1. 
 8. Oren Dorell, Duke Case Prosecutor’s Media Whirl Raises Eyebrows, USA TODAY, 
May 2, 2006, at A2; Benjamin Niolet, Rape Case Is a Factor, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, 
N.C.), Apr. 28, 2006, at A1. 
 9. By the end of 2006, a host of national and regional newspapers had demanded that 
Nifong dismiss the charges, recuse himself from the case, or resign from office. E.g., Editorial, 
As Duke Rape Case Unravels, Focus Turns to Prosecutor, USA TODAY, Dec. 27, 2006, at A12; 
Editorial, Disgraceful Nifong Should Depart, WILMINGTON STAR-NEWS, Dec. 27, 2006, at 12A; 
Editorial, Investigate the Investigation, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Dec. 23, 2006, at A12; 
Editorial, The Prosecutor Is Guilty, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Dec. 30, 2006, at A22; 
Editorial, Prosecutorial Indiscretion, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2006, at B6. 
 10. Joseph Neff, Benjamin Niolet & Anne Blythe, DA’s Critics Ask Bar, Feds to Intervene, 
NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 3, 2006, at A1. 
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for the most part, unreviewable power of the local prosecutor.11 With 
the prosecutor, and the prosecutor alone, rests the ultimate decision 
to prosecute or not to prosecute12 and the authority to employ “the 
most terrible instruments of government”13 against an individual. As 
“the most pervasive and dominant force in criminal justice,”14 the 
prosecutor wields an immeasurable influence over victims, 
defendants,15 and the larger community.16 Indeed, as former United 
States Attorney General and Supreme Court Justice Robert H. 
Jackson once famously remarked, “[t]he prosecutor has more control 
over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.”17 
Unbounded prosecutorial power is at odds with a government 
predicated on checks and balances18 and a legal system based on due 
process.19 Not surprisingly, it also invites abuse and public mistrust. 
Reports of wrongful convictions and wayward prosecutors who 
railroad defendants and bully defense attorneys saturate newspapers 
and scholarly commentary,20 shaking public confidence in a system 
held up as a model to the world.21 While cynicism about the system 
has escalated, however, the crisis has been ignored, as courts and bar 
associations have routinely failed to provide adequate oversight of 
prosecutorial power and safeguards against misconduct. Indeed, the 
 
 11. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY, at xxi 
(1980) (“A key characteristic of the American local prosecutor is the independent source of 
power he exercises as a result of his locally elected status. He enjoys an unreviewable 
discretionary power to prosecute, a power that has been consistently upheld by the courts.”). 
 12. United States v. Shaw, 226 A.2d 366, 368 (D.C. 1967). 
 13. Martin v. Merola, 532 F.2d 191, 196 (2d Cir. 1976) (Lumbard, J., concurring) (quoting 
Felix Frankfurter, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1941, at 20). 
 14. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 448 (1992). 
 15. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84–85 (1975). 
 16. JACOBY, supra note 11, at 195. 
 17. Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., The Federal Prosecutor, Address at the 
Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940), in 24 J. AM. JUD. SOC. 
18, 18 (1940). 
 18. Hugh L. Carey, N.Y. Governor, The Role of a Prosecutor in a Free Society, Speech 
before the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 30, 1976), in 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 317, 317–18 
(1976); John A. Lundquist, Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion—A Re-Evaluation of the 
Prosecutor’s Unbridled Discretion and Its Potential for Abuse, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 485, 485 
(1972). 
 19. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 
1522 (1981). 
 20. E.g., Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 
1999, at A1. 
 21. Id. 
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literature is replete with criticisms of “judicial passivity and bar 
association hypocrisy.”22 
This Note adds to the existing commentary by analyzing a 
neglected mechanism of prosecutorial oversight: the appointment of 
special prosecutors to supersede local prosecuting attorneys in certain 
criminal proceedings. Although state officials in some jurisdictions 
possess this “power of superseder,” they have used it sparingly;23 in 
other jurisdictions, its use by independent officials is altogether 
unavailable.24 This Note argues for increased use of the superseder 
power, coupled with explicit guidelines for its use and a public review 
process that current superseder jurisdictions lack. Part I outlines the 
institutional conditions that give rise to prosecutorial power and 
misconduct and highlights the failure of traditional remedies to 
provide adequate oversight. Part II reviews three approaches to 
removing prosecuting attorneys and appointing special prosecutors. 
Part III presents a legislative proposal for a powerful form of 
executive superseder authority, whereby governors and attorneys 
general would be required to intervene when prosecutorial conduct 
threatens the public trust, such as in cases involving conflicts of 
interest, allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, political 
controversy, and DNA exonerations. 
I.  PROSECUTORIAL POWER AND MISCONDUCT 
The extent to which prosecutorial abuse of power and discretion 
occurs in the criminal justice system remains unknown,25 but studies 
of the case law are not encouraging. In a 2003 study, the Center for 
Public Integrity found at least 2,012 cases since 1970 in which 
“individual judges and appellate court panels cited prosecutorial 
misconduct as a factor when dismissing charges at trial, reversing 
convictions or reducing sentences.”26 A 1999 study by the Chicago 
Tribune yielded sobering results as well, discovering at least 381 cases 
 
 22. BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, at vi (2d ed. 2005). 
 23. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 24. See infra notes 116–34 and accompanying text. 
 25. See Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving 
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 
45, 47 (2005) (noting that “[w]hile many commentators view prosecutorial misconduct as 
pervasive, empirical studies have been less conclusive”). 
 26. Steve Weinberg, Center for Pub. Integrity, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a 
Prosecutor Is Cited for Misconduct?, June 26, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/default. 
aspx?act=main. 
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since the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland 27 in 
which courts threw out homicide convictions because prosecutors 
concealed exculpatory evidence or presented evidence they knew to 
be false.28 
Although abuse of prosecutorial power finds its roots in a 
number of institutional conditions, three forces particularly 
encourage the problem: the lack of transparency that accompanies a 
prosecutor’s discretionary authority; the ambiguous ethical 
obligations for the prosecution function; and the absence of oversight 
and accountability for prosecutors.29 This Part will analyze each of 
these contributing factors, focusing in particular on the failure of 
traditional remedies to monitor and check the conduct of prosecuting 
attorneys. 
A. Vast Discretionary Authority with Little or No Transparency 
Although the vast prosecutorial power of local district attorneys 
is well entrenched in the American legal system, the source of such 
power is somewhat of a curiosity. The office of local prosecutor finds 
its origin in either explicit constitutional provisions or statutes, 
depending on the jurisdiction,30 but the boundless discretionary power 
associated with it is more a result of “default rather than a conscious 
legislative judgment,”31 finding legitimacy in a combination of 
statutory interpretation, the common law, “ambiguous substantive 
criminal laws,” and “intentional legislative over-generalization.”32 
Instead of narrowing this power, the judicial branch has contributed 
to its development, as the courts have “endowed [the prosecutor] 
with great power” over time.33 Moreover, legislatures have declined to 
 
 27. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In Brady, the Court held that “the suppression 
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where 
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.” Id. at 87. 
 28. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20. 
 29. Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful 
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 400. 
 30. DAVID M. NISSMAN & ED HAGEN, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 2 (1982). 
 31. James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE 
L.J. 651, 680. But see N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 18 (“The District Attorney shall advise the officers 
of justice in his district [and] be responsible for the prosecution on behalf of the State of all 
criminal actions in the Superior Courts of his district . . . .”). 
 32. Lundquist, supra note 18, at 490. 
 33. JACOBY, supra note 11, at 295. 
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articulate any limitations on prosecutorial discretion.34 As a result, 
modern prosecutors “wield vastly more power than ever before” and 
are increasingly “more insulated” from review.35 
This vast discretionary authority is accompanied by little or no 
transparency.36 Indeed, prosecutors determine whom to charge, what 
charges to file, and how to obtain convictions for those charges in 
secret.37 This situation breeds potential for impropriety, as it vests in 
one official the power to “invoke society’s harshest sanctions on the 
basis of ad hoc personal judgments,”38 which can often be “capricious 
or politically induced.”39 Furthermore, because most cases never 
reach the trial stage, the motives for these decisions, and any 
accompanying misconduct, rarely come to light.40 Even in cases that 
do make it to trial, prosecutorial misconduct “can take extraordinary 
efforts to uncover.”41 Lack of transparency and “rampant” hidden 
misconduct42 in the prosecutorial process provide striking irony in a 
system based upon the principles of fairness and due process.43 Thus, 
not surprisingly, these institutional ills reach beyond any individual 
defendant, breeding public distrust in local law enforcement44 and 
shaking confidence in our justice system as a whole.45 
 
 34. JAY DOUGLASS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN PROSECUTION 2 (1988). 
 35. Gershman, supra note 14, at 393. 
 36. Joy, supra note 29, at 400. 
 37. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 207–08 
(1969). 
 38. Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1555. 
 39. DAVIS, supra note 37, at 224. 
 40. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1522 (“The fate of most of those accused of crime is 
determined by prosecutors, but typically this determination takes place out of public view—in 
the hallways of the courthouse, in the prosecutors’ office, or on the telephone.”). 
 41. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20; see also Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics 
of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 106 (1991) 
(“A prosecutor’s ethical breach rarely will appear clearly on the trial record. Often it will be 
known only to the prosecutor herself.”). 
 42. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 550, 
562 (1987). 
 43. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1555 (“[P]rosecutors are not held to anything 
remotely like what due process would require if they were engaged in an acknowledged rather 
than a hidden system of adjudication.”). 
 44. NISSMAN & HAGEN, supra note 30, at 2. 
 45. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20. 
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B. Ambiguous Ethical Guidelines 
Lack of transparency in the prosecutorial process constitutes just 
one of the institutional conditions that have contributed to the 
current crisis. Indeed, in theory, a comprehensive set of ethical 
guidelines, coupled with effective professional discipline, could 
combat the distrust generated by the hidden nature of the 
prosecutorial process, providing prosecutors with explicit boundaries 
of conduct and reassuring the public that attorneys who crossed these 
bounds would be checked. Quite the contrary exists in practice, 
though, as vague ethical rules and inadequate remedies for 
prosecutorial misconduct actually exacerbate the problem by 
“provid[ing] ambiguous guidance to prosecutors” and “creat[ing] 
perverse incentives for prosecutors to engage in, rather than refrain 
from, prosecutorial misconduct.”46 
The failure of the ethical codes to provide guidance to 
prosecutors has been the source of exhaustive commentary.47 The 
American Bar Association articulated its first set of ethical guidelines 
for prosecutors in 1908 with the adoption of the Canons of 
Professional Ethics (Canons),48 which stated that “[t]he primary duty 
of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict, but to see 
that justice is done.”49 Nearly a century later, this ethical guideline has 
remained largely unchanged, despite its vague, if not contradictory, 
decree. Indeed, although the ABA’s most recent promulgation of 
ethical guidelines, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules), 
prescribes a handful of special ethical obligations for prosecutors,50 
 
 46. Joy, supra note 29, at 400. 
 47. See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 15, 79–98 (describing how the Code of Professional 
Responsibility and the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function fail to establish 
rules of ethical conduct); Susan W. Brenner & James Geoffrey Durham, Towards Resolving 
Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 415, 436–68 (1993) (discussing the 
failure of the ethical codes to address prosecutorial conflicts of interest); Bruce A. Green, 
Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1587–97 (2003) (exploring the 
inadequacies of Model Rule 3.8); H. Richard Uviller, Commentary: The Virtuous Prosecutor in 
Quest of an Ethical Standard, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1145–66 (1973) (discussing a number of 
ethical concerns that prosecutors face and arguing that the ABA ethics projects inadequately 
deal with these problems); Zacharias, supra note 41, at 53–66 (noting the vagueness of the “do 
justice” decree and attempting to provide clarity to the ethical codes). 
 48. Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 436. 
 49. ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 5 (1908). 
 50. Specifically, the Model Rules require that prosecutors 1) refrain from prosecuting 
charges that they know are not supported by probable cause; 2) make “reasonable efforts” to 
assure the accused has the opportunity to obtain counsel; 3) not seek the waiver of pretrial 
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the Rules still rely on the Canons’ basic theme of seeking or doing 
justice.51 Yet the “seek justice” decree, practically speaking, is not a 
guideline at all,52 and as a result, “the prosecutor is thrown back on his 
own subjective value and notions about fundamental fairness.”53 
Not only do the ethical codes fail to provide guidelines for 
seeking justice, but they also contribute to the “fuzzy” self-image54 of 
prosecutors by conflicting with their institutional responsibility to 
seek convictions.55 The political nature of the district attorney’s office 
reinforces the prosecutor’s role as zealous advocate. As elected 
officials,56 district attorneys use high conviction rates as measures of 
success,57 currying public favor for their current political office and, in 
some cases, future aspirations, such as advancement to the bench or 
Congress.58 Even low-level prosecutors are not immune from the 
importance of convictions, as they seek promotion within the legal 
field.59 Thus, one part zealous advocate, one part “minister of 
justice,”60 prosecutors are cast into “schizophrenic muck”61 and must 
 
rights from the accused without legal representation; 4) make timely disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence; 5) not subpoena defense counsel as a witness except in extenuating circumstances; and 
6) refrain from making inflammatory extrajudicial statements regarding the accused. MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2003). 
 51. The commentary to the Model Rules states, “A prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.” Id. cmt. 1. 
 52. Gershman, supra note 14, at 445; Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors Seek 
Justice?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 622 (1999). 
 53. Green, supra note 52, at 622. 
 54. JACOBY, supra note 11, at xv. 
 55. Joy, supra note 29, at 416; Zacharias, supra note 41, at 106. 
 56. The chief prosecutor is an elected official in every state except Alaska, Connecticut, 
and New Jersey. STEVEN W. PERRY, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 (Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, Bulletin No. NCJ No. 213799, July 2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf. In the District of Columbia, the chief prosecutor is also unelected. Id. 
 57. Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 205 (1988). 
 58. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Discipline of Prosecutors: A Response to Professor 
Zacharias, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 121, 125–26 (2001). As Harvard University Professor Alan 
Dershowitz quipped, “Winning has become more important than doing justice. Nobody runs for 
the Senate saying I did justice.” Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20. 
 59. See Dunahoe, supra note 25, at 49 (“[I]ndividual low-level prosecutors are responsible 
for a significant percentage of prosecutorial misconduct, and, further . . . these prosecutors seek 
primarily to maximize professional gains.”). 
 60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003). 
 61. Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 
982 (1985). 
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bend into “psychological pretzels”62 to fulfill the duties of their office. 
As one commentator notes, “Maintaining the ‘justice’-oriented stance 
that the dual role implies is one of the most psychologically difficult 
tasks that lawyers are asked to perform . . . .”63 Some commentators 
even believe it is impossible to reconcile these competing ethical and 
institutional duties.64 
C. Lack of Oversight and Accountability 
A system with little transparency and ambiguous ethical 
guidelines produces opportunities for abuse of power and discretion, 
even on the part of well-meaning prosecutors.65 Despite this potential 
for abuse, prosecutors face little accountability for their conduct. This 
lack of oversight further contributes to the pervasive nature of 
prosecutorial misconduct,66 providing the individual who has “more 
control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in 
America”67 with “every incentive, and little disincentive, to engage in 
violations that will help . . . produce convictions.”68 But is the existing 
framework of prosecutorial oversight truly “meaningless or 
nonexistent”?69 
The legal system offers a number of mechanisms that, in theory, 
provide oversight of the prosecution function. First, the courts can 
directly limit errant prosecutorial conduct within a criminal 
 
 62. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a 
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1697 (2000). 
 63. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10 (1986). 
 64. See Uviller, supra note 62, at 1718 (“Passion and dispassion are not cut from the same 
mentality.”); Zacharias, supra note 41, at 104 (“[A]sking prosecutors simultaneously to advocate 
within a process and assure that the process is fair is inherently contradictory—and perhaps 
hopeless.”). 
 65. See generally Jonakait, supra note 42, at 556 (“These pressures are omnipresent. They 
are not aberrations in the system, but part of the system itself. They operate in the routine case 
on the well-meaning prosecutor, the prosecutor seeking the correct result. The ethical 
prosecutor is told that he must believe in the defendant’s guilt, but the irony is that because he 
believes that, he is inevitably pushed toward misconduct. The venal prosecutor seeking the 
wrong result may be a danger, but the forces described here are more dangerous, because they 
will be strongest on the self-righteous prosecutor, and everything in our criminal justice system 
compels the prosecutor to believe the rightness of his cause. In other words, these pressures for 
misconduct come when the prosecutor acts like a prosecutor.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 66. Joy, supra note 29, at 426. 
 67. Jackson, supra note 17, at 18. 
 68. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 771 
(2001). 
 69. GERSHMAN, supra note 22, at vi. 
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proceeding, either remedying the offending action at the trial level70 
or overturning a conviction on appeal.71 These remedies aim not to 
discipline the offending prosecutor, but rather to correct any 
constitutional wrongs to the individual defendant.72 Conversely, 
professional discipline by bar associations targets prosecutors who 
have violated the ethical codes, having little or no impact on wronged 
defendants.73 Finally, in addition to judicial remedies and professional 
discipline, a wronged defendant may seek damages from a prosecutor 
in a civil lawsuit.74 In reality, the effective use of any of these 
corrective mechanisms is rare.75 Furthermore, even if employed more 
frequently, these remedies possess limitations that make them 
inadequate mechanisms for prosecutorial oversight and ineffective 
safeguards against misconduct. 
1. Judicial Remedies.  In theory, trial courts serve an important 
prosecutorial oversight function, boasting an arsenal of tools through 
which to curb prosecutorial misbehavior, such as the power to 
suppress evidence and quash charges.76 In addition, appellate courts 
may overturn convictions procured, in part, by prosecutorial 
misconduct.77 Yet because the courts employ the exclusionary rule in 
suppressing evidence at trial and “harmless error” analysis on appeal, 
both of which focus on violations of a defendant’s rights rather than 
 
 70. See Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: 
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1086 (1994) (noting 
suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges as possible remedies). 
 71. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 77. 
 72. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“[T]he touchstone of due process 
analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the 
culpability of the prosecutor.”); Morton, supra note 70, at 1102 (discussing how the exclusionary 
rule is “primarily designated for constitutional violations”). 
 73. See Morton, supra note 70, at 1102 (“Ethical rules . . . were designed to subject 
attorneys to discipline, not to supply grounds for remedying breaches of the substantive rights of 
the accused.”). 
 74. JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 13.02 (3d ed. 2003). 
 75. See, e.g., GERSHMAN, supra note 22, § 14:9 (discussing the rare use of contempt charges 
to sanction errant prosecutors); Gershman, supra note 14, at 454 (rare use of professional 
discipline); Green, supra note 47, at 1585 (rare use of civil liability); Ellen Yaroshefsky, 
Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time To Take Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275, 
291–92 (2005) (rare appellate reversal). 
 76. Morton, supra note 70, at 1086. 
 77. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 77. 
03__DENNIS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:18:11 PM 
2007] PROSECUTORIAL OVERSIGHT 141 
the prosecutor’s culpability,78 judicial remedies do not address the full 
scope of prosecutorial misconduct and thus are an inadequate check 
on errant prosecutors.79 Indeed, although courts may lament improper 
actions by prosecutors that fall short of constitutional violations,80 
their failure to punish prosecutorial misconduct recalls, as one judge 
said, “the bitter tear shed by the Walrus as he ate the oysters.”81 One 
professor amusingly describes the courts’ approach to prosecutorial 
misconduct as “[t]he prosecutor screwed up but the defendant is 
guilty, so what the hell.”82 The possibility that wronged defendants 
can also be guilty, however, reveals a theoretical flaw with judicial 
remedies. Specifically, if courts accounted for the full range of 
prosecutorial misconduct by suppressing evidence, dismissing charges, 
or overturning convictions accordingly, society would suffer the 
consequences of a guilty person going free while the prosecutor 
effectively would receive no “more than a personal slap on the 
wrist.”83 Neither judges nor the public are willing to accept such a high 
price to address what both regard as collateral harm at best. 
Aside from suppressing evidence or overturning convictions, a 
court may hold an offending prosecutor in contempt.84 This remedy, 
unlike the ones previously mentioned, goes more to punishing the 
prosecutor than relieving the criminal defendant, and thus provides 
an avenue for supervising prosecutorial conduct that does not reward 
a guilty person with freedom. Its effectiveness, however, is limited to 
 
 78. See GERSHMAN, supra note 22, § 14:3 (“Under the harmless error rule, appellate courts 
are authorized to ignore trial errors that did not prejudice the defendant’s substantive rights.”); 
Morton, supra note 70, at 1100 (“Suppression [under the exclusionary rule] is . . . reserved for 
constitutional violations which infringe basic rights of defendants in criminal trials.”). 
 79. See Zacharias, supra note 41, at 48. (“Constitutional appeals neither guide prosecutors 
who overestimate their obligations to defendants nor effectively rein in overaggressive 
attorneys.”). 
 80. Fisher, supra note 57, at 199 (citing United States v. Skandier, 758 F.2d 43, 44 (1st Cir. 
1985)). 
 81. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 661 (2d Cir. 1946) (Frank, J., 
dissenting). 
 82. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 84. 
 83. Id. at 77; see also United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1939) (“[The 
prosecutor made] plainly an improper remark, and if a reversal would do no more than show 
our disapproval, we might reverse. Unhappily, it would accomplish little towards punishing the 
offender, and would upset the conviction of a plainly guilty man.”). 
 84. Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. 
L. REV. 629, 673 (1972). 
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cases that reach the trial level.85 Furthermore, excessive use of the 
contempt power may violate the separation of powers doctrine. Not 
surprisingly, “trial courts are very reluctant to institute sanctions 
against prosecutors, seen as functionaries from another branch of 
government with distinct roles of their own to play for the system to 
stay in equilibrium.”86 In fact, the separation of powers doctrine 
underlines much of the judiciary’s permissive approach to 
prosecutorial power and misconduct—in particular, review of the 
charging function87—and poses a major obstacle to the judiciary 
fulfilling an active role in disciplining prosecutors. Thus, judicial 
remedies, whether because of their emphasis on wronged defendants 
or because of their inherent constitutional limitations, fail to serve as 
proactive checks on prosecutorial power and misconduct. 
2. Professional Discipline.  Professional discipline by bar 
associations provides another means of checking the power of local 
prosecuting attorneys.88 Indeed, some commentators have described 
professional sanctions and disbarment as the only effective safeguard 
against prosecutorial misconduct.89 In practice, however, this remedy, 
like trial sanctions and appellate reversal, is “so infrequent as to 
appear non-existent”90 and thus presents only a “slight” threat to a 
misbehaving prosecutor.91 Among the 381 homicide conviction 
reversals for prosecutorial misconduct discovered in a Chicago 
Tribune study, the newspaper reported that none of the offending 
prosecutors was subsequently barred from practicing law.92 Sanctions 
are even more uncommon in ongoing proceedings.93 “[C]onsequently, 
 
 85. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1523 (“But the existence of trials cannot check 
prosecutorial powers not dependent on trial.”). 
 86. Steele, supra note 61, at 981. 
 87. Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 88. WOLFRAM, supra note 63, § 13.10.2. 
 89. E.g., Green, supra note 47, at 1584–85 (citing NIKI KUCKES, REPORT TO THE ABA 
COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT CONCERNING 
RULE 3.8 OF THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 8–11 (1999)). 
 90. Gershman, supra note 14, at 454. 
 91. DOUGLASS, supra note 34, at 77. 
 92. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20. 
 93. See Zacharias, supra note 68, at 758 n.130 (surveying the various ways in which state 
bar associations respond to complaints filed during ongoing proceedings). Although 
unprecedented, state bar disciplinary charges levied during the middle of a criminal case 
eventually forced Durham County District Attorney Michael Nifong to ask for a special 
prosecutor in the Duke Lacrosse case. Anne Blythe, Joseph Neff & Michael Biesecker, Nifong 
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prosecutors may have developed a sense of insulation from the ethical 
standards of other lawyers.”94 
Bar associations face two hurdles in employing disciplinary 
sanctions as a means of monitoring prosecutorial conduct. For one, 
the ethical codes provide little guidance on what constitutes improper 
conduct on the part of prosecutors;95 they thus proscribe only a 
narrow range of sanctionable actions.96 Not surprisingly, “in the 
absence of clearly proscribed conduct,” disciplinary authorities are 
not “likely to enter the debate over when lawyers have acted too 
aggressively, or not aggressively enough, in prosecuting crimes.”97 In 
addition, because they derive their power from the judiciary, bar 
disciplinary committees, like the courts, may run afoul of the 
separation of powers doctrine when disciplining prosecutors.98 In this 
way, disbarment or other sanctions that limit the power of a 
prosecutor serve as a “de facto impeachment,” subverting the will of 
the public, which voted the prosecutor in office, and the legislature, 
which vested expansive powers in the district attorney’s office.99 In 
some jurisdictions, prosecutors have used this argument to challenge 
 
Steps Aside, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 13, 2007, at A1; see also infra notes 131–
34 and accompanying text. Nifong’s downfall, however, may have resulted more from the 
unique confluence of a number of factors—top-notch defense attorneys, actual innocence, and 
the need to rehabilitate the reputation of North Carolina’s criminal justice system—than any 
desire of behalf of the state bar to crack down on prosecutorial misconduct. See David Feige, 
One-Off Offing: Why You Won’t See a Disbarment Like Mike Nifong’s Again, SLATE, June 18, 
2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2168680 (“[I]t took a perfect storm of powerful defendants, a rapt 
public, and demonstrable factual innocence to produce the outcome that ended Mr. Nifong’s 
career.”); see also Mark Johnson, Disbarment of Nifong Rare Move by Bar: Protection of Peers 
or Few Violations the Reason?, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, June 26, 2007, at A1 (noting the 
possible influence of two other high profile cases of prosecutorial misconduct on the state bar’s 
actions). 
 94. Steele, supra note 61, at 966. 
 95. See supra Part I.B. 
 96. Zacharias, supra note 68, at 738. Professor Zacharias articulates just three areas “in 
which disciplinary authorities are likely to have both the wherewithal and inclination to 
proceed.” Id. They are: “(1) pretrial and trial conduct that is specifically forbidden in the codes; 
(2) engaging in pretrial publicity; and (3) the implementation of prosecutors’ obligations to 
report other lawyers.” Id. 
 97. Id. at 736 n.62. 
 98. Id. at 761. 
 99. See Steele, supra note 61, at 968–69 (“Whenever a disciplinary sanction makes it 
impossible for a prosecutor to function, that sanction has assumed the role of the impeachment 
process in a way that may very well be contrary to the will of both the electorate and the 
legislature.”). 
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disciplinary sanctions—and won.100 Thus, because it does not 
recognize the scope of prosecutorial misconduct and may violate the 
separation of powers doctrine, professional discipline serves as an 
inadequate method by which to regulate prosecutorial power, both in 
theory and in practice. 
3. Civil Liability.  The threat of civil liability may also curb 
prosecutorial power. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any state official who 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of 
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.101 
In Imbler v. Pachtman,102 however, the Supreme Court significantly 
curtailed the use of § 1983 actions as redress for prosecutorial 
misconduct, granting prosecutors absolute immunity in initiating a 
prosecution and presenting the state’s case.103 Subsequent decisions 
have employed Imbler’s functional approach104 to define the scope of 
prosecutorial immunity, carving out some instances in which the 
prosecutor fulfills an administrative or investigative role and thus 
enjoys only qualified immunity.105 
The Imbler Court recognized the importance of shielding the 
prosecutor from civil liability, noting that “[t]he public trust of the 
prosecutor’s office would suffer if he were constrained in making 
every decision by the consequences in terms of his own potential 
liability in a suit for damages.”106 It added, “If the prosecutor could be 
 
 100. Id. at 968 (citing Simpson v. Alabama State Bar, 311 So. 2d 307 (Ala. 1975), and 
Snyder’s Case, 152 A. 33 (Pa. 1930)). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 102. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). 
 103. Id. at 430–31. Ironically, the Court noted a prosecutor’s “amenability to professional 
discipline” as “undermin[ing] the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way 
to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.” 
Id. at 429. In reality, prosecutors are hardly amenable to professional discipline. See supra notes 
88–100 and accompanying text. 
 104. E.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). 
 105. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129–30 (1997) (swearing to the truth of facts in a 
certification for determination of probable cause); Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275, 278 (manufacturing 
false evidence and making statements to the press); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) 
(advising police in the investigative phase of a criminal case). 
 106. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424–25. 
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made to answer in court each time [a defendant] charged him with 
wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted from the 
pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.”107 Such considerations 
provide a powerful argument against calls to reevaluate absolute 
immunity for prosecutors108 and illustrate why civil liability provides 
only a limited check on prosecutorial power and misconduct. 
*          *          * 
Prosecutors enjoy unparalleled discretionary power and 
authority within the American legal system. This power often leads to 
abuse and misconduct, though, because of the lack of transparency in 
the prosecutorial process, the vague ethical duties imposed on 
prosecutors, and the failure of existing remedies to provide 
accountability and oversight. Given the ineffectiveness of judicial 
sanctions, professional discipline, and civil liability, the task becomes 
finding a means of oversight that protects defendants’ rights, punishes 
errant prosecutors, and restores public confidence in the system. Part 
II addresses another potential oversight mechanism—the 
appointment of special prosecutors. 
II.  SPECIAL PROSECUTORS 
An additional means of prosecutorial oversight is the use of 
special prosecutors to supersede local prosecuting attorneys in 
criminal proceedings.109 Such a mechanism presents a proactive 
approach to the issue of prosecutorial accountability. “Totally 
uninvolved with any social/political complexities attending the 
particular case, the special prosecutor [can] concern himself with but 
one thing: the efficient and ethical prosecution of the case.”110 
Furthermore, because this form of oversight allows an independent 
party (i.e., the special prosecutor) to review a local prosecuting 
attorney’s files, it provides transparency for the process and deters 
errant prosecutorial conduct. Appointments of special prosecutors 
 
 107. Id. at 425. 
 108. For a critique of the absolute immunity that prosecutors enjoy, see generally Douglas J. 
McNamara, Buckley, Imbler, and Stare Decisis: The Present Predicament of Prosecutorial 
Immunity and an End to its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135 (1996). 
 109. Lawrence Taylor, A Needed Legal Specialty: The Special Prosecutor, 61 JUDICATURE 
220, 221 (1977). 
 110. Id. at 224. 
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arise in these ways: requests by prosecutors,111 court order,112 and 
executive superseder.113 This Part will explore each of these 
approaches as a means of curbing prosecutorial power. 
A. Appointment by the District Attorney 
Special prosecutors may be appointed at the request of the 
district attorney. Although the ethical codes have failed to develop 
clear guidance on when prosecutors should make such requests,114 
mechanisms through which prosecuting attorneys may recuse 
themselves from cases and request special prosecutors are not 
uncommon.115 
In some jurisdictions, though, these mechanisms are the only 
means by which a special prosecutor may be appointed to a case. 
North Carolina provides one such example. In North Carolina, an 
attorney from the state’s Special Prosecution Division “shall be 
available to prosecute or assist in the prosecution of criminal cases,” 
but only “when requested to do so by a district attorney and the 
Attorney General approves.”116 Ironically, North Carolina’s Special 
Prosecution Division was formed not to combat prosecutorial 
conflicts of interest or misconduct, but rather to “expedite Justice and 
provide speedy trials”; to help with the “tremendous caseloads” 
encountered in local prosecuting offices; and to provide time and 
resources to cases that “involve complex legal questions, extensive 
research and expert trial assistance.”117 Over time, however, the office 
has evolved as a mechanism by which local prosecutors can decline to 
participate in controversial matters involving a conflict of interest.118 
 
 111. See infra Part II.A. 
 112. See infra Part II.B. 
 113. See infra Part II.C. 
 114. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-107 (2006) (stating that district attorneys may be 
disqualified upon their own request, at which point “the court having criminal jurisdiction may 
appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute or defend the cause”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 15.733(4) (2006) (“In the event that a prosecuting attorney is disqualified, he shall certify such 
fact in writing to the Attorney General who may direct another Commonwealth’s attorney or 
county attorney or an assistant attorney general as a special prosecutor to represent the 
Commonwealth in that proceeding.”). 
 116. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-11.6 (2006). 
 117. H.B. 670, 1973 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1973). 
 118. Andrea Weigl, State Steps in When Cases Defy the Ordinary, NEWS & OBSERVER 
(Raleigh, N.C.), Jan. 14, 2007, at A12. 
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The North Carolina attorney general’s office has stated that its 
Special Prosecution Division handles “dozens of cases a year.”119 Yet 
when used as the sole means through which to appoint special 
prosecutors, systems such as the one in North Carolina are 
inadequate for a myriad of reasons. First, most recusal statutes 
provide little guidance as to when a prosecutor should request a 
special prosecutor. North Carolina’s statute, for example, is silent on 
the matter.120 Other states’ recusal statutes do somewhat better, 
focusing on when prosecutors have a “personal interest in the 
cause.”121 Commentators, however, have noted the difficulty in 
defining prosecutorial conflicts of interest.122 Such difficulty arises 
from the nature of the prosecutorial function itself:123 rather than 
advocating for one client, the prosecutor represents a number of 
constituencies—including the community, the victim, the defendant, 
and the state.124 As such, professional disciplinary boards and courts 
have only imposed sanctions for conflicts of interest when the 
prosecutor has “an axe to grind”125 or a direct personal interest in the 
litigation.126 
Prosecutors, however, may face situations, short of a direct 
personal interest in a case, in which their conduct still constitutes a 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-11.6. 
 121. E.g., LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 680 (2006). 
 122. See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 47, at 1160 (“Of the several formulations directly or 
indirectly instructing the prosecutor in the ethical imperatives of his calling, none . . . has come 
close to dealing clearly or comprehensively with the problem of conflicting interests.”); cf. 
Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 436 (arguing that past attempts to codify prosecutorial 
ethics have not paid sufficient attention to conflicts of interest). 
 123. Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 471–72 (“Not having an identifiable client, [the 
prosecutor] does not have a readily available benchmark to be used in determining whether he 
has a conflict.”). 
 124. Zacharias, supra note 41, at 57. 
 125. Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 126. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987) (“In a 
case where a prosecutor represents an interested party, however, the ethics of the legal 
profession require that an interest other than the Government’s be taken into account. Given 
this inherent conflict in roles, there is no need to speculate whether the prosecutor will be 
subject to extraneous influence.”); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249–50 (1980) (“A 
scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process may 
bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision and in some contexts 
raise serious constitutional questions.”); Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) 
(affirming the reversal of a domestic dispute conviction when the prosecuting attorney was 
retained to represent the wife of the defendant in a divorce proceeding). 
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conflict of interest:127 for example, prosecuting a case in which the 
prosecutor has previously committed misconduct or undertaking an 
explosive case in an election year, among others. The ethical codes 
provide no instruction for prosecutors in these situations, and courts 
have held that political bias does not constitute an impermissible 
conflict of interest.128 These situations, though, are the ones in which 
the public trust may be most shattered, and the appointment of a 
special prosecutor most needed. 
Furthermore, even if states such as North Carolina clearly 
articulated the conflicts of interests that would necessitate the 
appointment of a special prosecutor, the system would be only as 
good as the prosecutors it was designed to check.129 Specifically, 
without an independent means by which to appoint special 
prosecutors, jurisdictions are at the mercy of local prosecutors, who 
may be disinclined to open their case files to an outside party for fear 
of disciplinary or political repercussions.130 
Indeed, the Duke Lacrosse case illustrated these concerns and 
exposed major flaws in North Carolina’s oversight of local 
prosecuting attorneys and appointment of special prosecutors. 
Despite allegations of prosecutorial improprieties, Durham County 
District Attorney Michael Nifong refused to turn the matter over to 
the state’s Special Prosecution Division.131 As public distrust and 
criticism of the district attorney’s conduct grew, complaints flooded 
 
 127. Professors Susan W. Brenner and James Geoffrey Durham differentiate between 
“generic conflicts”—that is, those arising from prior representations or personal interests—and 
“systemic conflicts.” Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 417. The latter are “inherent in [a 
prosecutor’s] distinct responsibilities: the political reality of having to please the electorate; the 
necessity of being an advocate; and the ethical requirement of being an ‘administrator of 
justice.’” Id. 
 128. Azzone v. United States, 341 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1965); United States v. Terry, 806 
F. Supp. 490, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he undisputed fact that Abrams sought to obtain 
political gain from his prosecution of Terry is not enough to disqualify him.”). 
 129. Commentators have advanced a similar argument regarding the inadequacy of the 
existing ethical obligations of prosecutors. See Vorenberg, supra note 19, at 1545 (“[S]uch limits 
are likely to be no stronger than the determination of the men and women who abide by them 
to limit their own discretion.”). Thus, in effect, states that vest the sole means of appointing a 
special prosecutor with the district attorney are preserving the ethical status quo—that is, self-
regulation. 
 130. See Brenner & Durham, supra note 47, at 444 (“The prosecutor . . . is faced with 
making the decision [to withdraw] on his own, followed by the political reality of having to 
make his reasons for withdrawal public, thus placing his decision in the political arena.”). 
 131. John Stevenson & Adam Playford, Nifong: Some Criticism May Be Justified, HERALD-
SUN (Durham, N.C.), July 29, 2006, at A1. 
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discretion by committing misconduct or undermining the public trust 
is only a natural extension of the various “private challenge 
statutes”138 that call for courts to appoint special prosecutors when 
prosecuting attorneys have abused their discretion in refusing to 
prosecute.139 Thus, just as when a victim alleges prosecutorial abuse of 
discretion, a defendant could request a special prosecutor upon a 
showing to the court that the prosecuting attorney has committed 
misconduct and that the appointment of a special prosecutor is 
necessary.140 
In practice, however, the judicial power to remove prosecuting 
attorneys and to appoint special prosecutors has not been given such 
an expansive scope. For instance, in West Virginia, a state in which 
the judiciary is vested with such authority,141 if “there is any factual 
question as to the propriety of the prosecutor acting in the matter, he 
must be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard.”142 
Furthermore, the West Virginia Supreme Court has “narrowly 
drawn” the authority of the courts to appoint special prosecutors, 
limiting its use to “only particular cases in which the prosecutor is 
disqualified for any of the standard reasons for disqualifying judicial 
or quasi-judicial officers.”143 Those “standard reasons” are 
sanctionable conflicts of interest, which only arise in limited situations 
in which the prosecutor has a direct personal interest in the 
proceeding.144 
 
 138. Stuart P. Green, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory 
Judgment Statute, 97 YALE L.J. 488, 493 (1988). 
 139. E.g., TENN. CONST. art. 6, § 5; ALA. CODE § 12-17-186 (2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-
209 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (2006); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 11-16-06 (2006); 16 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1409 (2006); WIS. STAT. § 968.26 (2006); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 388.12 (2006) (allowing a district court judge to appoint an attorney to assist or 
serve in place of the county attorney). In State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1977), 
the Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that, under the relevant statute, “[a]rguably, a private 
citizen could petition the district court for action . . . and the court could appoint a special 
prosecutor if it decided that this was necessary.” Id. at 365. The court, however, noted the 
possible constitutional infirmity of such a use. Id. 
 140. See Comment, Private Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted 
Inaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 215 (1955) (“Following a showing by a private citizen that the public 
prosecutor has abused his discretion through inaction or improper action, the court would have 
the power to appoint a privately hired attorney to act as the public prosecutor for a single 
action.”). 
 141. W. VA. CODE § 7-7-8 (2006). 
 142. State ex rel. Preissler v. Dostert, 260 S.E.2d 279, 287 (W. Va. 1979). 
 143. State ex rel. Brown v. Merrifield, 389 S.E.2d 484, 487 (W. Va. 1990). 
 144. See supra notes 125–26 and accompanying text. 
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Indeed, the statutory authority for courts to remove prosecutors 
and appoint special prosecutors may need to be “narrowly drawn” to 
avoid violating the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. 
Specifically, a broad interpretation of these statutes would enable 
trial courts to appoint special prosecutors over the objections of 
prosecuting attorneys, stripping the executive branch of its power to 
prosecute and transferring that power to the judiciary.145 Thus, not 
surprisingly, the doctrine of separation of powers has invalidated 
private challenge statutes in at least one state146 and formed the basis 
of criticisms of the jurisdictions that continue to allow victims to 
petition trial courts for private prosecutors.147 
Even if a broad interpretation of the judiciary’s authority to 
remove prosecuting attorneys and appoint special prosecutors passed 
constitutional muster, the scheme would still fail to check 
prosecutorial misconduct because it would vest the power of 
prosecutorial regulation in a branch of government that historically 
has been reluctant to police prosecuting attorneys directly,148 even for 
contempt of court.149 Thus, resting such power on the shoulders of the 
judiciary would be an ineffective means of combating prosecutorial 
misconduct, both because such authority violates the separation of 
powers doctrine and because courts routinely fail to exercise their 
existing powers to rein in errant prosecutors. 
C. Executive Superseder 
Executive superseder power, either by a governor or an attorney 
general, provides the third means by which to remove a local 
prosecuting attorney from a case and appoint a special prosecutor. 
Some jurisdictions vest this power directly with attorneys general as 
part of the duties of their office, either because they share concurrent 
 
 145. See United States v. Shaw, 226 A.2d 366, 368 (D.C. 1967) (“The trial court should 
remember that the District Attorney’s office is not a branch of the court, subject to the court’s 
supervision. It is a part of the executive department, separate and apart from the judicial 
department.”). 
 146. In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 873–74 (Wyo. 1984). 
 147. Green, supra note 138, at 504. In lieu of “[p]rivate challenge statutes that allow courts 
to order a prosecutor to proceed or to appoint a special prosecutor to take his place,” which he 
rejects as “constitutionally unsound,” id. at 498, Green advocates for the courts to issue 
declaratory judgments that a prosecutor has abused his discretion not to prosecute, creating 
“public pressure” on the prosecutor and giving the plaintiff “political leverage,” id. at 489. 
 148. Gershman, supra note 14, at 409; Steele, supra note 61, at 981. 
 149. GERSHMAN, supra note 22, § 14:9. 
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authority to prosecute crimes with district attorneys150 or because they 
possess supervisory powers over local prosecutors.151 For example, in 
setting forth the duties of the office of attorney general, section 12550 
of California’s Government Code states: 
When [the attorney general] deems it advisable or necessary in the 
public interest, or when directed to do so by the Governor, he shall 
assist any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, and may . . . 
take full charge of any investigation or prosecution of violations of 
law of which the superior court has jurisdiction. In this respect he 
has all the powers of a district attorney . . . .152 
This provision has been interpreted as bestowing broad and unilateral 
powers of superseder on the attorney general when required by the 
public interest.153 
Even in some states in which their duties do not include the 
power to intervene in a local matter on their own initiative, attorneys 
general still may, on request by the governor, remove a local 
prosecutor from a case and appoint a special prosecutor.154 New York 
has such a mechanism for appointing special prosecutors; section 
63(2) of the state’s Executive Law grants the governor sweeping 
authority to direct the attorney general to “attend in person, or by 
one of his deputies, any term of the supreme court or appear before 
the grand jury thereof for the purpose of managing and conducting in 
such court or before such jury criminal actions or proceedings as shall 
be specified in such requirement.”155 
New York’s system for appointing special prosecutors 
occasionally has led to litigation, with most challenges dealing with 
notice and reasonableness of superseder orders.156 Relying on the 
state’s constitutional mandate that the governor “shall take care that 
 
 150. E.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550 (2006). 
 151. E.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.090 (2006). 
 152. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12550. 
 153. Attorney General May Supersede District Attorneys in Justices’ Courts Prosecutions 
as Well as Those in Superior Courts, 46 Op. Att’y Gen. Cal. 385 (1947). 
 154. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-31-101(1)(a) (2006); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(2) (McKinney 
2006). 
 155. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 63(2). 
 156. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1997) (supersession in a 
potential death penalty case); Mulroy v. Carey, 396 N.Y.S.2d 929, 929–30 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977), 
aff’d, 373 N.E.2d 369, 369 (N.Y. 1977) (supersession in an investigation involving allegations of 
corruption among public officials). 
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the laws are faithfully executed,”157 the New York courts, however, 
have repeatedly upheld the validity of the governor’s power of 
superseder under Executive Law section 63(2).158 Indeed, the courts 
have found that this provision, together with article IV, section 3 of 
the New York Constitution, provides the governor with unlimited 
authority to supersede a local prosecuting attorney in any matter.159 
Even with this broad grant of power, New York governors have 
historically been reluctant to exercise the power of superseder, stating 
that the office should only supersede the local prosecuting attorney in 
“extraordinary emergencies” and “unusual circumstances or 
conditions.”160 Professor Robert Pitler notes, “The power of 
superseder has been used rarely, and such is its design.”161 
Despite their reluctance to exercise the power of superseder and 
its correspondingly rare use, governors have not entirely disregarded 
and neglected the mechanism. Between 1907 and 1973, New York 
governors employed the power of superseder in at least seventy-nine 
cases.162 Governor Hugh Carey ordered the supersession of a district 
attorney on five occasions during his two terms as governor,163 and 
Governor Mario Cuomo exercised the power of superseder sixteen 
times between 1983 and 1994.164 Governor George Pataki used the 
power sparingly, ordering the attorney general to supersede a local 
prosecuting attorney just four times during his tenure as governor 
from 1995 to 2006 and exercising the power last in 1996.165 
When they have exercised the power of superseder, New York 
governors have not limited its use to traditional cases of 
disqualification, such as when the local prosecuting attorney possesses 
 
 157. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 158. Johnson, 691 N.E.2d at 1005. 
 159. Id. at 1006. The Johnson court noted, “No such limitation appears in the Constitution 
or statutes, and none has been found in prior case dealing with these very issues.” Id. 
 160. See, e.g., 1894 PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR FLOWER 66–67. 
 161. Robert M. Pitler, Superseding the District Attorneys in New York City—The 
Constitutionality and Legality of Executive Order No. 55, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 517, 522 (1973). 
 162. Lawrence T. Kurlander & Valerie Friedlander, Perilous Executive Power—Perspective 
on Special Prosecutors in New York, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 35, 49 n.103 (1987). 
 163. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, §§ 3.14, 3.31, 3.42, 3.50, 3.78 (2006). 
 164. Id. §§ 4.83, 4.89, 4.106, 4.110, 4.115, 4.122, 4.124, 4.128, 4.138, 4.144, 4.165, 4.174, 4.175, 
4.180, 4.183, 4.184. Neither Governor Carey nor Governor Cuomo’s tallies include any 
appointments made pursuant to §§ 1.55–.59, in which Governor Rockefeller ordered the 
Attorney General to investigate and prosecute public corruption in New York City beginning in 
1972. After eighteen years, Governor Cuomo terminated those orders in 1990. Id. § 4.139. 
 165. Id. §§ 5.6, 5.9, 5.27, 5.42. 
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a direct personal interest. Rather, they have employed the power in a 
variety of situations that threatened the public trust, including cases 
involving police corruption,166 racial tension,167 and the death 
penalty.168 Because of their unlimited authority to supersede, New 
York governors also have the power to remove a local prosecuting 
attorney and appoint a special prosecutor upon allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct.169 Indeed, believing that the boundless 
power and discretion afforded to prosecuting attorneys was at odds 
with American ideals of officials with limited powers,170 Governor 
Hugh Carey viewed the power of superseder as a means of checking 
errant prosecutors.171 In a speech to the New York Bar Association, 
Governor Carey remarked, “A Chief Executive is inevitably tempted 
to abdicate any responsibility for law enforcement and to leave to the 
people, the prosecutors, and the courts the thankless chore. I will not 
do so. A constitutional form of government is at stake.”172 
Because the district attorney “is a state executive officer 
performing a state function and is therefore subject to the exercise of 
the governor’s executive power,”173 New York’s method of removing 
prosecuting attorneys and appointing special prosecutors does not 
possess the same constitutional infirmities as a model that affords the 
judicial branch the same power.174 Likewise, it vests an independent 
party (i.e., the governor and/or attorney general) with an oversight 
function, thus avoiding the inevitable conflicts of interest that arise 
when local prosecuting attorneys have the sole authority to remove 
themselves and ask for special prosecutors in certain cases.175 The 
executive power of superseder, however, is not without its share of 
 
 166. Id. §§ 1.55–.59. 
 167. Id. § 4.89. For a detailed summary of the “Howard Beach incident,” in which surviving 
victims of a racial attack refused to cooperate in an investigation due to mistrust of the police 
and local district attorney, a stalemate that eventually required the governor to appoint a special 
prosecutor to handle the investigation, see Kurlander & Friedlander, supra note 162, at 56–58. 
 168. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, § 5.27. 
 169. See Maurice H. Nadjari, New York State’s Office of the Special Prosecutor: A Creation 
Born of Necessity, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 116 (1974) (“The Attorney General could also 
undertake investigation and prosecution of misconduct by a district attorney, if the Governor 
issues an Executive Order superseding the district attorney’s local prosecutorial power.”). 
 170. Carey, supra note 18, at 317–18. 
 171. Id. at 323. 
 172. Id. at 318. 
 173. Pitler, supra note 161, at 545. 
 174. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra notes 129–34 and accompanying text. 
03__DENNIS.DOC 11/1/2007  3:18:11 PM 
2007] PROSECUTORIAL OVERSIGHT 155 
concerns. Part III will address those concerns as part of a 
comprehensive legislative proposal that calls for states to adopt an 
executive power of superseder. 
III.  A PROPOSED METHOD OF  
APPOINTING SPECIAL PROSECUTORS 
The unlimited power of local prosecutors and the lack of 
effective and timely remedies for prosecutorial misconduct demand a 
means of oversight through which independent executive officers may 
employ a power of superseder in certain criminal proceedings to 
remove a local prosecutor and appoint a special prosecutor. Yet 
officials with this power rarely have exercised it, even in states in 
which the power enjoys expansive scope and potential application.176 
Furthermore, some jurisdictions have tied the hands of state officials 
so they cannot employ the superseder power at all.177 The infrequent 
use of this form of prosecutorial oversight is unfortunate, and 
legislatures and executive officers should reconsider this policy of 
deference to local prosecuting attorneys. This Part argues that state 
legislatures should establish an executive superseder power and 
provides a framework through which this mechanism can serve an 
important prosecutorial oversight function while also minimizing the 
problems that arise when “unfettered discretion”178 shifts from one 
public official to another. 
Legislatures should implement an executive power of superseder 
because such power directly targets the institutional conditions that 
contribute to prosecutorial abuse of power and misconduct. First, it 
provides a form of prosecutorial oversight that, unlike appellate 
reversals or professional discipline,179 addresses both the wronged 
defendant and the errant prosecutor. By placing a case in the hands of 
a special prosecutor, the mechanism provides the defendant a fair 
process, affording the defendant an impartial prosecutor who is 
unassociated with any of the events surrounding the case.180 At the 
same time, removal from a case also may serve as a public reprimand 
of the offending prosecutor: in contrast to appellate reversals that 
 
 176. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 177. See supra notes 116–34 and accompanying text. 
 178. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1016 (N.Y. 1997) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 179. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text. 
 180. Taylor, supra note 109, at 224. 
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often shield prosecutors from shame by omitting their names from 
opinions,181 the names of prosecutors removed from cases by 
independent parties are public knowledge. Moreover, the 
appointment of special prosecutors also introduces transparency in 
the prosecutorial process. Specifically, special prosecutors who have 
access to the files of the original prosecuting attorneys may unearth 
prior misconduct or improper actions that would have remained 
hidden without review by an independent party. 
The scope of the executive power of superseder must be broad 
and extend beyond cases in which the prosecutor has a direct 
personal interest in the litigation.182 Supersession statutes should 
provide that the governor or attorney general’s office must employ 
the superseder power to remove a local prosecutor when the 
prosecutor faces “a difficult case beyond his investigative and legal 
abilities.”183 Additionally, such statutes should grant the executive 
branch the power to appoint special prosecutors in cases involving 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct184 or police abuse.185 The 
statutory authority of the governor or attorney general’s office to 
appoint a special prosecutor also should extend to second trials of 
cases in which misconduct by the prosecuting attorney resulted in a 
mistrial of the first trial186 and situations involving DNA 
exoneration.187 
 
 181. See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 20 (“In their written opinions, appeals courts 
rarely name prosecutors, even those found to have acted abominably.”). 
 182. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
 183. Taylor, supra note 109, at 221. 
 184. Carey, supra note 18, at 323. 
 185. FREEDMAN, supra note 15, at 93. 
 186. In Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982), the Supreme Court stated that the bar of 
double jeopardy under the United States Constitution only attached in situations in which a 
prosecutor’s misconduct was intended to “goad” the defendant into moving for a mistrial in the 
first trial. Id. at 676. Thus, Professor Gershman notes: 
[A] prosecutor with a weak or damaged case is encouraged to commit prejudicial 
conduct. If he gets away with it, he has a better chance of winning. If the defendant 
objects, and succeeds in obtaining a mistrial, the prosecutor will be able to retry the 
defendant with a better-prepared case . . . . 
Gershman, supra note 14, at 440. The appointment of a special prosecutor in these cases could 
limit this abuse. 
 187. Alan Hirsch, The Tragedy of False Confessions (And a Common Sense Proposal), 81 
N.D. L. REV. 343, 348–50 (2005) (reviewing MARGARET EDDS, AN EXPENDABLE MAN: THE 
NEAR-EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON JR. (2003)). Specifically, “[w]hen a credible case of 
DNA exoneration is made, responsibility for the defendant should automatically be transferred 
to a different office from that which prosecuted him.” Id. at 349. 
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An oversight mechanism, however, that transfers the boundless 
power of one public official to another raises its own set of 
concerns—specifically, the potential for abuse, especially in politically 
controversial situations. New York Governor George Pataki’s 
removal of Bronx County District Attorney Robert Johnson from a 
potential death penalty case involving a slain police officer in 1996 
provides one such example.188 Almost exactly one year after he 
succeeded in reinstating New York’s death penalty after eighteen 
years,189 Governor Pataki unilaterally decided to remove Johnson 
from the case, stating: 
The murder of a police officer is a stain on society. The individual 
who commits such a crime, and who was proven in a court of law 
beyond a reasonable doubt to have perpetrated this crime, should 
face a jury of twelve men and women to determine whether the 
death penalty is appropriate. A prosecutor who refuses to consider 
that course must be superseded.190 
Although the New York Court of Appeals validated Governor 
Pataki’s actions under Executive Law section 63(2) in Johnson v. 
Pataki,191 Judge Smith’s dissent voiced concern over the power of 
superseder in death penalty cases, noting that “[w]hatever evils may 
flow from the exercise of unfettered discretion in the decision-making 
process, they are not addressed or remedied by the self-appointed 
transfer of discretion from one individual to another.”192 In addition, 
governors may improperly use the power “to immunize political 
friends and even to prevent scrutiny of corruption in a governor’s 
own administration.”193 Political pressures may also lead governors 
 
 188. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, § 5.27 (2006) (executive order requiring 
Attorney General Dennis Vacco to supersede District Attorney Robert Johnson). 
 189. James Dao, Death Penalty in New York Reinstated After 18 Years; Pataki Sees Justice 
Served, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at A1. 
 190. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Pataki Signs Executive Order to 
Supersede Bronx District Attorney Johnson (Mar. 21, 1996) (on file with the Duke Law 
Journal). Ironically, Governor Pataki noted Johnson’s political philosophy against the death 
penalty improperly influenced Johnson’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and thus was a 
reason for supersession. Id. (“The law states that we have a death penalty. District Attorney 
Johnson refuses to enforce this law. I have no choice but to replace District Attorney Johnson 
with someone . . . who will not allow political philosophy to control his professional 
responsibility and judgment . . . .”). 
 191. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1997). 
 192. Id. at 1016 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 193. Pitler, supra note 161, at 547. 
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not to use the power of superseder, such as when its use may offend 
influential constituencies or threaten political allies. 
Because of the potential for such abuse, a system that enables a 
governor or attorney general to supersede a local prosecuting 
attorney must include guidelines articulating when such power may 
be exercised,194 as well as a means of reviewing its use.195 Specifically, 
the governor or attorney general’s office must implement a means by 
which defendants, local public officials, and even members of the 
general public may make requests for special prosecutors as well as a 
framework to review these requests in a uniform manner. New York 
Governor Mario Cuomo initiated such a process, creating a 
committee that, when called upon by the governor, was to “consider 
and evaluate individual requests for the appointment of a special 
prosecutor”; “obtain the response of the local district attorney”; 
“report to the Governor the nature of the request and the response of 
the local district attorney”; and “recommend to the Governor 
whether additional action pursuant to section 63 of the Executive 
Law should be taken.”196 
The governor or attorney general’s office should also create a 
separate grievance committee to examine cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct.197 This committee would make 
recommendations to the governor or attorney general for the 
appointment of special prosecutors upon a finding of prosecutorial 
impropriety. It would also require that the governor or attorney 
general report any violation of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct to the state bar grievance board, thus serving as a powerful 
deterrent for errant prosecutorial conduct. To provide transparency 
for the superseder process, the recommendations of both committees 
 
 194. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 224 (discussing “the need to formulate procedures to deal 
with the substitution of prosecutors in a more uniform and effective way”). 
 195. See Kurlander & Friedlander, supra note 162, at 62 (“[A] regular procedure and 
consistent standard for review of special prosecutor requests will serve to highlight the 
extraordinary nature of the power and to add a level of review assistance to the Governor’s 
exercise of the appointment power.”). 
 196. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, § 4.109 (1995). 
 197. Such a committee could be modeled loosely after Texas’ short-lived Prosecutor 
Council. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 332d (Vernon 1977) (repealed 1985); see also Steele, 
supra note 61, at 982–88 (proposing an independent commission to handle allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct); Yaroshefsky, supra note 75, at 297–98 (same). Unlike the Prosecutor 
Council of Texas or other proposed independent prosecutorial commissions, however, the 
committee’s mission would be limited to advising the executive in the appointment of special 
prosecutors, not disciplining errant prosecutors. 
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should be made available to the public in an annual report issued by 
the governor or attorney general’s office. 
In addition to the executive branch’s internal safeguards, the 
judiciary must take an active role in reviewing the executive’s use of 
the superseder power. Review by the courts would enable prosecutors 
to challenge removal from a case. It also would protect communities 
from unwarranted usurpation of the duties of locally elected public 
officials by governors or attorneys general. In his analysis of New 
York’s power of superseder, Professor Pitler argues for such a review, 
noting that “some narrow standard of review would not interfere too 
greatly with the executive power, and yet could protect the public 
from arbitrary and capricious executive action.”198 Indeed, although 
they have bestowed seemingly limitless superseder power on the 
governor, the New York courts have “reserved the possibility that in 
some undefined circumstance, the courts could invalidate this 
executive action.”199 With its broad superseder mandate, New York 
Executive Law section 63(2) does not define the circumstances in 
which a governor may act beyond the scope of the superseder 
authority. As such, to assist judicial review of the process, state 
legislatures must clearly delineate the scope of the power of 
superseder and the instances in which governors or attorneys general 
may use such power in the supersession statutes. 
An additional safeguard against potential abuse by the executive 
branch may be to vest the power of executive superseder with 
attorneys general instead of governors.200 Although popularly elected
 
 198. Pitler, supra note 161, at 547. 
 199. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (N.Y. 1997) (citing Mulroy v. Carey, 373 
N.E.2d 369, 369 (N.Y. 1977)). The court in Johnson v. Pataki declined to define the standard by 
which to review the executive superseder power, questioning whether “one [was] applicable at 
all.” Id. at 1007. In his dissent, Judge Smith argued for a “rational basis” standard of review. Id. 
at 1014 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 200. Vesting the power of superseder with attorneys general raises constitutional concerns 
in some jurisdictions. Specifically, a number of state constitutions expressly grant district 
attorneys the exclusive authority to prosecute crimes in their districts. E.g., N.C. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 18. In these jurisdictions, a statute that grants the power of superseder to the governor would 
not be unconstitutional because of the governor’s constitutional duty to “take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed.” Id. art. III, § 5, cl. 1. A jurisdiction that vested such superseder power 
with the attorney general, absent an amendment to the state constitution, might be, however. 
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to office201 and driven by their own political aspirations,202 attorneys 
general still enjoy a lower public profile than their gubernatorial 
counterparts. Furthermore, as lawyers, they may possess greater 
knowledge of the legal system and thus may take a more informed 
approach in exercising the power of superseder. 
Even with established standards and procedures for appointing 
special prosecutors and judicial review of such appointments, the 
executive superseder power may still possess some limitations. For 
one, a mechanism that allows for the removal of prosecuting 
attorneys and the appointment of special prosecutors may invite 
abuse by defense attorneys eager to undermine the authority of the 
local prosecutor.203 Such abuse, if rampant, could potentially cripple 
the power of local prosecuting attorneys: preoccupied with fear of 
offending influential defense attorneys, prosecutors might temper 
their duty to prosecute in certain situations.204 It also could drain the 
resources of the state’s highest executive offices by overwhelming the 
system with frivolous requests for special prosecutors. Given the 
natural reluctance of governors and attorneys general to remove 
prosecutors from cases,205 however, this concern is likely insignificant 
and almost certainly outweighed by the benefits of an independent 
oversight mechanism. Furthermore, any potential misuse of the 
system by parties with improper motives may be deterred by assessing 
costs for reviewing such complaints or even levying fines against 
aggressive defense attorneys.206 
 
 201. Attorneys general are popularly elected in all but seven states. Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys 
Gen., How Does One Become an Attorney General?, http://www.naag.org/how_does_one_ 
become_an_attorney_general.php (last visited Sept. 27, 2007). 
 202. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, 
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2246, 2253 (2006) (noting “the political 
reality that the Office of the Attorney General has long been seen by many of its occupants as a 
stepping stone to the Governor’s office”). 
 203. See WOLFRAM, supra note 63, § 13.10.2 (discussing how complaints to disciplinary 
agencies “may be motivated by a desire to compromise the political power of the prosecutor’s 
office”); Zacharias, supra note 68, at 758 (noting the potential for defense attorneys to make 
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct to “manipulate bar proceedings for tactical purposes”). 
 204. The Supreme Court expressed the same fears with respect to civil liability in Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), noting that exposing prosecutors to civil liability “would prevent 
the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor’s duty that is essential to the proper 
functioning of the criminal justice system.” Id. at 427–28. 
 205. See supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
 206. Private challenge statutes, such as those discussed in Part II.B, face similar abuse. To 
thwart unfounded actions by individuals eager to reap financial rewards in subsequent civil 
actions, one recommended victims’ private challenge proposal has advocated assessment of such 
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Finally, the appointment of special prosecutors as a means of 
checking prosecutorial power and combating misconduct may prove 
only to be a Band-Aid remedy for a broken institution that, as some 
commentators have noted, begs for a drastic overhaul.207 Indeed, 
limited resources on the part of the governors and attorneys general208 
as well as public defenders and court-appointed defense attorneys 
may restrict the use of superseder to only the most egregious 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct and community distrust. These 
cases, however, are the ones most likely to grace front pages of 
newspapers and taint the general public’s perception of the 
prosecutorial process. As such, an independent check on local 
prosecutors in these cases will help repair public confidence in the 
legal system. Moreover, the specter of superseder may force 
prosecutors to account for their conduct in all cases—including the 
less visible ones—lest a special prosecutor ever review a case file and, 
upon discovering misconduct, report such improprieties to the 
appropriate officials.209 
CONCLUSION 
On April 11, 2007, nearly three months after his office received 
Michael Nifong’s request and assumed control of the case, North 
Carolina Attorney General Roy Cooper dismissed all charges in the 
Duke Lacrosse case, declared the three indicted players innocent, and 
called the incident “the tragic result of a rush to accuse.”210 Two 
months later, the North Carolina State Bar disbarred Nifong, finding 
that his conduct during the case constituted prosecutorial dishonesty 
 
costs to the victim’s private prosecutor to discourage malicious prosecutions. Comment, Private 
Prosecution: A Remedy for District Attorneys’ Unwarranted Inaction, supra note 140, at 233. 
 207. See Jonakait, supra note 42, at 565 (advocating “systemic reform”). 
 208. See Taylor, supra note 109, at 224 (discussing the costs of both retaining private 
attorneys to serve as special prosecutors and increasing the size of the attorney general’s office 
to accommodate a larger special prosecutions division). 
 209. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that attorneys report misconduct on 
the part of their peers: “A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of 
the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional 
authority.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2003). 
 210. Attorney Gen. Roy Cooper, Comments by Attorney General Roy Cooper: State v. 
Finnerty, Evans, Seligmann 1 (Apr. 11, 2007), http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentStreamer 
Client?directory=PressReleases/&file=Dismissal%20Statement%20Press.pdf. 
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and misconduct.211 In the aftermath of the tumultuous affair, Durham 
governmental leaders created a committee to review the handling of 
the case,212 and the North Carolina General Assembly considered a 
number of bills addressing criminal justice reform.213 The tragedy of 
the case, though, is that an earlier intervention by the North Carolina 
Attorney General could have avoided the toll it took on the 
defendants’ lives and the public’s confidence in the criminal justice 
system. Indeed, Attorney General Cooper recognized the need for 
prosecutorial oversight in North Carolina when he dismissed charges 
in the Duke Lacrosse case, noting “the enormous consequences of 
overreaching by a prosecutor” and calling for a form of judicial 
superseder to remove errant prosecutors from cases.214 
As this Note has argued, however, that power should rest with 
the executive office, rather than with the judiciary. Prosecutors bear 
the burden of maintaining order and confidence in the criminal justice 
system, working to punish the guilty but also striving to protect the 
innocent. Many perform their duties with the utmost integrity. But 
the public, as well as prosecutors themselves, demand more of the 
system than internal controls and an individual’s “own attitudes and 
beliefs on inner morality.”215 Enhanced use of special prosecutors, 
appointed by independent executive officials, provides a means of 
curbing errant prosecutors and restoring public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. This mechanism has largely been ignored by 
members of the state executive and legislative branches. State 
officials, however, should reconsider this option in limiting the power 
of local prosecutors. The integrity of the American legal system 
demands it. 
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